Сэр Джайме.
Антология средневекового военного искусства (на английском).
Здесь находится вступление.
So, we start. Why the heavy cavalry first? Firstly, the heavy
cavalry was the soul and heart of medieval military system. Secondly, the biggest
part of popular misconceptions concerns it.
Let's define our terms first. Who must be included in the "heavy cavalry"
category? Obviously, the mounted knight falls here. But by no means did the
medieval heavy cavalry consist solely of knights. In fact, in any major muster
the proportion of knights (in the strict social sense of this word) in the heavy
cavalry was at best around 1/5 to 1/3. Who were the rest? Mostly, squires -
the rank of the noblemen below the knight, usually serving as retainers of a
knight. Also, the heavy cavalry could consist of mercenaries (especially in
the Italian armies), who not necessarily were nobles by birth at all.
There is also another often misunderstood term - "man-at-arms". It
is a more general term, meaning a professional warrior, usually in heavy armour
(in our period - the full plate). So, all the knights were men-at-arms, but
not all of the men-at-arms were knights. To speak more widely, all the heavy
cavalrymen were men-at-arms, but not all of the men-at-arms were cavalrymen
at all.
So, in most precise definition, the heavy cavalryman of the second half of the
14th-15th century, is a professional warrior in the full plate armour (at the
beginning of the period - a composite armour of both mail and plate) on a specially
bred and trained horse (often also partly armoured), armed with a long lance,
a sword and sometimes an assortment of other hand weapons.
What can we tell of the individual horseman of this sort? First, his armour.
A lot of silly myths exists around the full plate. We are told that such an
armour was cumbersome, to such an extent that an armoured knight moved with
difficulty, couldn't mount his horse without help, and could not stand up once
knocked from his feet. The stories are told about the knights who died inside
their armour without receiving a blow, of heart attack - because of the sheer
weight of the full plate.
It's simply not true. The fully developed plate armour weights about 25-30kg
- like a backpack of modern NATO infantryman, and the weight is distributed
evenly over the whole body, without exceptionally taxing any specific group
of muscles. Furthermore, the armour is cunningly articulated, and doesn't significantly
restrict the natural movements. When the NASA specialists were designing the
space suit, they looked to the suit of full plate armour and LEARNT from it.
A man clad in such a suit could not only walk freely, but run, jump, mount a
horse... indeed there are contemporary descriptions suggesting that a strong
man could even perform a somersault in it! The heart failures happened sometimes,
but not from the weight. The main cause was the heat. It could be really hot
inside a full plate, especially on a sunny day in the middle of a melee.
The protection that this armour offered was excellent. The steel wasn't really
thick, but it had a lot of smoothly rounded surfaces designed specifically to
lead the blades away in glancing blows. On the other hand, it's very difficult
to CUT through the armour, but it's quite possible to THRUST through it with
right selection of weapons, and even without cutting through the knight could
be beaten very seriously inside his armour by just banging on it with a blade.
So the wearer of the full plate armour is well-protected, but by no means invulnerable.
By the way, it's another popular myth that the gunpowder weapons made the full
plate obsolete. In fact, they were no more effective than the longbow, and less
effective than the contemporary steel crossbow, when it comes to armour penetration,
but a handgun was easier in exploitation, and didn't demand much training to
use it.
But let's return to the heavy cavalry. The main force of the medieval heavy
cavalry is in its' charge. That's what the lances are for - for the first moment
of impact upon the enemy. The armour is needed not only for protection, but
for the weight it adds to the power of the impact as well.
To understand the proper tactical implementation of the charge, let's mark its'
strong and weak points. The first effect of a heavy cavalry charge is psychological.
Imagine for a moment that you are standing in the infantry ranks, watching the
thundering tide of steel coming on you at incredible speed, armour glistening,
ground trembling, as a single mass. The first natural inclination, no matter
how personally brave you are, will be to turn and run. That's exactly one thing
that the infantryman MUSTN'T do, if he wants to live. A footman cannot outrun
a horseman. In medieval Germany the heavy cavalry was duly nicknamed "the
Peasants' Death". The untrained rural militia often fled before the charge
even before the actual impact. In this case they were ridden down mercilessly
to the last man. The infantry which trembles as the charge is delivered, will
be massacred.
The second effect of the charge is the actual impact. You may have read somewhere
that the armour of men and horses was so heavy, that the charge was delivered
at a low speed, like a trot. The mistake becomes obvious as soon as you understand
that the full plate armour actually weighted LESS than the equipment of a heavy
cavalryman of the second half of 19th century. Yes, we should add the weight
of the armour for the horse itself, but it couldn't be very heavy, and besides,
the destrier - knightly warhorse - was an exceptional animal, specially bred
and trained just for such conditions. The ideas of the exceptional weight of
the armour originated in the 19th century, when romanticist collectioners often
confused the tournament armours (which indeed were much heavier) and the actual
ones worn in battle. So, the charge could be delivered at full gallop. The shock
must have been formidable. The cavalry wouldn't cut through the infantry, as
it's often depicted, because it's not the same as a knife and a piece of butter,
but two groups of men who will naturally lose any formation upon impact. It
wouldn't cut through, but it would smash, and push and roll back the enemy in
disarray, and even the troops who didn't run before the impact, are likely to
do so after it.
The heavy cavalry never actually attacked in "wedges", or "lance
formations". If they did, it would be a suicide for those in the front
line (as they would be easily surrounded), and a failure for the overall plan,
because the casualties would be too great in the first moment to continue the
pressure. The idea of a deep formation to "cut the enemy in two" makes
sense for the infantry, it's impossible to implement effectively on horseback.
Such formations may have been used in confined spaces, but certainly never intentionally
against infantry.
The natural formation for the charge is the wave. It allows to use all of the
lances in the first moment (after which they are useless and often even broken).
But the "wedge" (or indeed the deep column) formation can be useful.
Not for attack - but for approach and positioning before the charge. The armour
is light enough to enable the horse to gallop, but it's heavy enough to prevent
it to gallop for a long time. The strengths of the horses must be saved before
the charge to achieve maximum speed possible. It means that prior to the charge
the heavy cavalry must move as close to the enemy as possible (to 200-250 metres
at least) slowly. During this time they are a nice target for anything that
shoots. The deep column formation minimizes the space presented as a target.
On reaching the appropriate position the cavalry must reform into the wave.
Sometimes the infantry would be concealed in the middle of the column (which
again demonstrates that the column moved slowly), and would form up behind the
cavalry wave in order to follow the charge and prevent the scattered enemy from
reassambling (the Teutonic knights did this in the battle on the frozen lake
Peipus in 1242, which is commonly known in Russia as "the Ice Slaughter").
The distance between the starting position for the charge and its' object must
not be great for one more reason: during the prolonged charge the wave formation
inevitably breaks (because one horse naturally runs more quickly than another);
if it happens, the horsemen reach their destination not as a single mass, but
in ones and twos and small groups one after another. It greatly reduces the
effectiveness of a charge. So the distance must be long enough to allow the
horses to achieve high speed, but not long enough to allow the wave to scatter.
As early as the Crusades, the heavy cavalry on the battlefield was organised
into small tactical detachments called conrois in French; a conrois consisted
usually of about 20 to 30 mounted men-at-arms, who attacked in closely-packed
(stirrup to stirrup) linear formation, two or three ranks deep, arranged in
a checkerboard pattern. These conrois would form side to side with each other,
resulting in a more or less dense wave. Such a formation would be very difficult
to maintain in full gallop, that's why sometimes in order to make a more coherent
impact on the enemy, the horsemen moved in canter instead of gallop, which is
slightly slower (about 25 km/h), but still fast enough for a strong charge.
By the way, there is a curious bit of information I've encountered recently,
which I can't prove or disprove yet, but which generally makes sense: that the
heavy cavalry couldn't maintain a trot for any prolonged time, because it was
extremely uncomfortable for an armoured man on a horseback. Thus a "trotting
charge" is completely out of question; canter and gallop are the only possible
variations for a charge, one resulting in a weaker, but more organised impact,
and another - vice versa.
But even the correctly delivered charge may be stopped by the disciplined infantry
in deep ranks, particularly armed with spears or pikes and well-trained in their
usage. No sane horse would charge the hedgehog of pikes, and no sane horseman
would make it do so. But the infantry must be numerous and disciplined enough
not to waver in face of the coming charge, or else the determined mass of cavalry
willing to take some casualties can break through the wall. We'll discuss the
infantry tactics in another article; for now it's sufficient to say that it's
not wise for the heavy cavalry to charge the formed-up pikemen.
So, the ideal heavy cavalry charge must be delivered as follows: 1) on the appropriate
enemy (another force of cavalry, untrained and/or confused infantry from any
side, any force from flank or rear, particularly if it's already engaged from
the front, pikemen ONLY in the last case, and even then - with great caution);
2) in the appropriate place (obviously, the wide plain is the best for the cavalry,
not the forest or a place crossed with bogs and pits); 3) from the appropriate
distance; 4) at the appropriate speed (canter would be more suitable against
better organised and formed-up enemy, gallop - accordingly, against a more disorganised
or wavering one); 5) as a single coherent mass (so it must be well-led); 6)
and finally, at the appropriate moment of time (at the tactically crucial point
in battle). A good cavalry charge is capable of turning the tide of battle,
but it demands a good deal of preparation to deliver it properly; so the most
difficult task of the commander is to judge the place and moment correctly.
The well-known battles of the 14th century are often said to prove the ineffectiveness
of heavy cavalry charge. They say, the arrival of good missile weapons and good
infantry on the battlefield doomed the medieval heavy cavalry. I definitely
don't agree with it. Yes, there were several catastrophic defeats of the armies
based around the mounted knight. But there were victories as well, and all the
defeats of the cavalry were due to the mistakes of its' commanders, not to some
distinct advantages of the other troops.
At Courtrai the Flemish infantry militia defeated and massacred the French knights.
BUT the knights, due to the failure of their high command, launched the charge
from extra-long distance over the terrain crossed by channels(!). Eighty years
later the French made the Flemings pay the bloody price at Roosebek. There a
skillfully delivered flanking cavalry charge resulted in the rout and massacre
of essentially the same foot militia. The Scots beat the English at Stirling
Bridge, because the English charged piecemeal into the prepared ranks of pikemen.
At Falkirk the English first perforated the Scots with the longbows, and then
charged into the confused and decimated ranks of their pikemen... the result
is well-known. At Crecy in 1346 the French again failed to organize the charge
properly - and only because of that were defeated by the massive longbow fire.
Had there been no confusion in the French ranks, had they rested and prepared
properly, had their King led them more wisely than he did, they would be perfectly
capable of winning that day. The same is true for Poitiers (1356) and Agincourt
(1415), which were actually very closely-fought battles. At Agincourt the French
had a very sound plan of outflanking the English and riding down their archers
before they could do much damage. They would surely win if the plan was performed
smoothly. But they had no capable King to command them again, and all ended
once more in terrible confusion. At Nikopolis in 1396 the Western (mostly French
and Burgundian, with some Germans and Poles) heavy cavalry rode down the Turkish
irregular infantry without even noticing it, scattered the regular troops and
even broke through a line of field fortifications(!) - all in one prolonged
charge, but then fell in the Turkish trap because of the (again) incompetence
of their inexperienced command (represented by young Comte de Nevers, future
Duke of Burgundy Jean the Fearless, and several bickering barons), who failed
to make the reconnaissance ahead, and rejected the wise plan of the Hungarian
King (future German Emperor) Sigismund to send forward the infantry and then
charge, when the enemy discloses his disposition...
What is truly astonishing about all of these battles is sheer discipline and
fighting spirit demonstrated by the heavy cavalry on almost all occasions. These
men were not quick to fly and not easily broken, even when used in such a way
that they had little chances of success. At Crecy the French knights charged
the English lines 16(!) times, thrown back again and again with heavy losses.
At Agincourt they regrouped and attacked again, with such an "elan",
to use the French word, that almost broke the English when they were already
celebrating victory. Almost... but we shall speak yet of the English side of
these events, when we'll speak about infantry. But it's obvious that discipline
wasn't usually the thing the heavy cavalry lacked, contrary to the popular belief.
At least it was certainly valued and sought, even if not always actually obtained.
The weakest point of a medieval army, the most prone to failure, was usually
its' high command. The heavy cavalry remains what it is - a very powerful instrument,
but difficult to wield properly and demanding a tactical skill in application.
25 Октября 2001 (13:40:07)
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